Japan and the changing global balance of power: The view from the summit by Dobson, H.
	



	

		
			
	

	
				
 

!
∀
#∃%&∋()	∗∗∗
∀∀


+	
++	,
	# %−(  ./&0−−1&2 . 34
		5

∗∋∋∋∋∋6∋/24.&32&∋∋ 25
	

	

∗	!
∀
#∃%&∋()	
∗∗∗
∀∀


+	++	,
	# %−(  ./&#
∀∀
+	∋∋∋∋∋6∋/24.&32&∋∋ 25	
+7∀

.
++

	7+
8
	

−.9∗:


	
				
	
	;	

				

  
Japan and the Changing Global Balance of Power: 
The View from the Summit 
By 
Hugo Dobson 
School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield 
h.dobson@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
The final definitive version of this article has been published in: 
Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 33-42. 
 
By the Political Studies Association 
 
An electronic version is available here: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-9256 
 
Suggested Citation:  
Dobson, H µ-DSDQDQGWKH&KDQJLQJ*OREDO%DODQFHRI3RZHUWKHYLHZIURPWKH
SXPPLW¶3ROLWLFV9RO1RSS-42. 
 
This article is a post-review corrected version. Readers are advised to refer to the published 
article for accurate citation and referencing. If you are unable to access the published 
version, then please contact the author at: h.dobson@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
  
Hugo Dobson Politics 2010 
1 
 
Japan and the Changing Global Balance of Power: 
The View from the Summit 
 
Abstract 
7KLVDUWLFOHH[SORUHV-DSDQ¶VUHODWLYHGHFOLQHDQGLWVUHVSRQVHVWRWKHFKDQJLQJJOREDOEDODQFH
of power through a case study of one symptom of this shift: the rise of the G20 as the 
µSUHPLHUIRUXP for international economic co-RSHUDWLRQ¶DWWKHH[SHQVHRIWKH*7KH*
has traditionally held a VLJQLILFDQWSRVLWLRQLQ-DSDQ¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVWKDWDSSHDUVWR
be undermined by the rise of WKH*-DSDQ¶VUHVSRQVHVWRWKHVHGHYHORSPHQWVUHYHDOLWWo be 
a status quo power that is still committed to internationalism and multilateralism and looking 
for a constituency to lead. 
 
Introduction  
This article is premised upon the idea that the shift in the central mechanisms of global 
governance from the Group of Eight (G8) largely industrial democracies to the Group of 
Twenty (G20), including many developing countries, is representative of the changing global 
balance of power. Leaders from within the G8, such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy, 
and outside, such as Brazilian President Lula da Silva, have declared the age of the G8 to be 
RYHUµ:HDUHWDONLQJDERXWWKH* EHFDXVHWKH*GRHVQ¶WKDYHDQ\PRUHUHDVRQWRH[LVW¶
(BBC News, 2009). This shift away from the G8 has particular importance for Japan, whose 
government and people have traditionally placed considerable importance both on this forum 
of the ZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJHFRQRPLHVDQGRQWKHLUUROHWKHUHLQ 
The contrasting fortunes of Japan are captured by two photographs. At the 1983 G7 
Williamsburg Summit, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro broke the mould of Japanese 
prime ministers being regularly placed on the periphery of the official summit photograph by 
elbowing his way between US President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher at the centre of the photo to reinforce the bilateral US±Japan alliance and create a 
space for Japan at the centre of this mechanism of global governance (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 
June 1983, p. 2). Almost a quarter-century later at the G20 London Summit in April 2009, 
-DSDQ¶VGHFOLQLQJ position in the world was represented by Prime Minister Aso Taro finding 
himself in the back row, whereas Chinese President Hu Jintao stood centre-stage next to the 
host, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. An expanded G20 not only dilutes -DSDQ¶V
presence at these summits but points to the broader decline in its position in the world. 
Alasdair Young (2010, in this issue) presents more concrete examples of this relative decline 
in terms of power capabilities. However, this fall from grace is even more stark if the way in 
which Japan was regarded in the 1980s and at the end of the Cold War is recalled ± Japan as 
the next superpower, Japan as no. 1, Pax Nipponica and the coming war with Japan ± all 
seem wildly optimistic, naïve or wide of the mark. Today, the talk is of lost decades, the US 
passing Japan in favour RI&KLQDUDWKHUWKDQEDVKLQJLWµ-DSDLQ¶LQVWHDGRI-DSDQDFFRUGLQJ
to a headline in The Economist. 
7KLVDUWLFOHDUJXHVWKDW-DSDQ¶VJOREDODQGUHJLRQDOGHFOLQHUHODWLYHWRChina is also reflected 
in the shift from the G8 to the G20. Nonetheless, Japan has responded by being proactive 
within the G20 and has sought to promote the shared values, norms and principles of liberal 
Hugo Dobson Politics 2010 
2 
 
democracies within the G20. The article begins by explaining the significance of the G8 in 
Japanese international relations. It then explores the shift of global economic governance 
from the G8 to the G20 before analysing how Japan has responded. It concludes by 
FRQVLGHULQJZKDW-DSDQ¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKH*reveals about its changing place in the world. 
The G8 in Japanese international relations 
Since its first meeting as a Group of Six (G6) in Rambouillet, France in November 1975, the 
*KDVFRPHWRRFFXS\DFHQWUDOSRVLWLRQLQ-DSDQ¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDO relations. Excluded from a 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where it is still symbolically 
UHIHUUHGWRDVDµIRUPHUHQHP\¶-DSDQKDV received recognition from the G8 as a 
contemporary great power by virtue both of its economic standing and of the broader 
representation of the Asian region that its inclusion secures. From 1975 onwards, Japan has 
responded positively to this and carved out a number of roles for itself within G8 summitry. 
First of all, an internationalist norm, which dictates that Japan should play a responsible role 
in the international community, has shaped its wider role in the world since the end of the 
Second World War. A seat at the G8 summit table as a recognised contemporary great power 
provided the Japanese government with a venue in which it could achieve this objective. In 
the simplest of terms, this can be seen in its hosting of consistently successful G8 summits (as 
graded by Sir Nicholas %D\QHDQGWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI7RURQWR¶V*5HVHDUFK*URXSLQWKHFDVH
of Tokyo (1979, 1986 and 1993), Okinawa (2000) and Hokkaido (2008)), in addition to its 
SURPRWLRQRIVSHFLILFDJHQGDLWHPVRQWKH*¶VDJHQGDVXFKDVFOLPDWHFKDQJH global health 
and information technology, and its increasing compliance with G8 pledges (as monitored 
DJDLQE\WKH*5HVHDUFK*URXS$V-RKQ.LUWRQSKDVDUJXHGµ>W@KHUHFRUG
clearly shows that Japan continues to be a committed and consequential contributor to global 
governance, and convincingly suggests that this will continue to be itVUROHLQWKHZRUOG¶ 
6HFRQGDV'XMDUULFKDVDUJXHGµWKH*KDVVSHFLDOYDOXHLQ-DSDQHVHH\HVIRUWKH simple ± 
and very emotional ± reason that neither China nor any other country without European roots 
LVDPHPEHU¶-DSDQ7LPHV2FWREHUSI2). In this context, Japan has assumed the 
role of representative of the Asian region with enthusiasm and has regularly sought to garner 
the opinions and concerns of the region, take them to the summit table and then report back to 
its Asian neighbours. Hosting a summit in particular has provided Japan with the opportunity 
to give the G8 a specific Asian flavour. 
Finally, the G8 has mattered to Japan in a number of other ways that are common to all G8 
countries. These include the pursuit of national interests often unconnected to G8 summitry; 
an impetus to manage bilateral relations, chiefly with the US, at the summit; and an 
opportunity, rarely taken successfully, for the Japanese prime minister of the day to exhibit 
his leadership qualities (Dobson, 2004). Thus, within its broader international relations, 
membership of the G8 has provided Japan with an opportunity to demonstrate its 
commitment to international society, manifest in the above roles, while according it the status 
and recognition it has actively sought in the post-war period. 
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Replacing the G8 with the G20 threatens to dilute this importance, and it is worth recalling 
the previous shift in the global balance of power that took place with the end of the Cold War 
to appreciate the importance Japan accords to a smaller, exclusive group of like-minded 
countries. Towards the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s as Cold War structures 
unravelled, the G7 and the prospect of Russian membership in an expanded G8 provided two 
of the chief mechanisms by which WKHIRUPHU6RYLHW8QLRQ¶VWUDQVLWLRQWRFDSLWDOLVPDQG
democracy and acceptance into international society were managed. This process reached its 
conclusion with the first official G8 summit in Birmingham in 1998 and the first Russian-
hosted summit in St Petersburg in 2006. On the one hand, Russia gained acceptance as a 
contemporary great power within this elite club while, on the other hand, the G7 sought to 
socialise Russia in the democratic principles that served as the ideological glue that bound the 
summiteers together in the absence of any concrete membership criteria. However, the 
Japanese government and its people resisted the PRPHQWXPWRZDUGV5XVVLD¶VLQFOXVLRQ
within this elite club. This hard-line opposition applied equally to the provision of financial 
assistance and was reiterated in the strongest terms in a post-G7 summit speech when Foreign 
Minister Nakayama Taro compared it to throwing money into a ditch (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 
July 1990). Later that decade, the reason the 1997 Denver Summit was not officially called 
the µ*¶EXWUDWKHUWKHµ6XPPLWRIWKH(LJKW¶ZDVEHFDXVHRI-DSDQHVHREMHFWLRQVWR 
5XVVLD¶VPHPEHUVKLS7KH-DSDQHVHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVWUDWHJ\RIUHVLVWDQFHLQWKLVFDVH was 
based largely on maintaining and reinforcing the boundarLHVRIWKH*¶VHOLWH position within 
international society. However, it ultimately failed to resist the RWKHUVXPPLWHHUV¶GHVLUHWR
integrate Russia into the G8 (Dobson, 2010). One misgiving about the shift to the G8 was 
because of the value that Japan placed, and continues to place, on being the only non-Western 
member of the G8. At the same time, the Japanese government has seen G8 (at least G7) 
members as a caucus of like-minded democracies that share the same values, which is also 
part of the reason wh\LWUHVLVWHGDQ\DWWHPSWWRGLOXWHWKLVWKURXJK5XVVLD¶VLQFOXVLRQLQWKH 
1990s. 
Although it is moot as to whether the G8 has been the most important forum for Japan in the 
conduct of its international relations, it has still been a very important forum that has 
UHFRJQLVHG-DSDQ¶VVWDQGLQJLQWKHZRUOGEDVHGFKLHIO\RQLWVJOREDO economic power and its 
ideational power as a development model within the Asian region. However, the relative 
decline in these positions as a result of the rise of China, coupled with the shift to the G20 as 
a symptom of the changing balance of power, threatens the roles and identities that Japan has 
carved out for itself. 
From G8 to G20 
In 2008, in response to the global economic crisis, the G20 was upgraded from a meeting of 
finaQFHPLQLVWHUVRULJLQDOO\FUHDWHGLQWRWKHOHDGHUV¶OHYHO Although the role of the 
G20 is essentially the same as the G8 in so far as it seeks to inject political leadership into the 
collective management of global issues and co-ordination of policies while not replacing the 
formal and legal mechanisms of global governance, this shift was a symptom of the changing 
global balance of power. This can be seen in both the membership and power capabilities of 
both forums. The G8 includes Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
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UK and the US, accounting for 66 per cent of global economic output but only 14 per cent of 
population. In contrast, the G20 includes 19 countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK and the US), in addition to the EU as a 20th member 
represented by the presidents of the European Council and European Commission, 
accounting for 90 per cent of global economic output and 67 per cent of population. Although 
the G20 grapples with its own issues of representation and legitimacy, it is seen to trump the 
G8 in these aspects and, as Paul Martin (2005, p. 2), progenitor of the original G20 proposal, 
H[SODLQHGµ>S@XWVLPSO\WKHULJKWFRXQWULHVZHUHQRWVLWWLQJGRZQDWWKHVDPHWDEOH at the 
VDPHWLPH¶ 
But what is the evolving relationship between the two and how does this disadvantage Japan 
and its position in the world? To answer the second question first, the elitism and exclusivity 
of the G8 that recognised Japan as a founding member is clearly diluted by an expanded G20. 
)XUWKHUPRUH-DSDQ¶VRQFH-exclusive role as the voice of Asia in global economic governance 
is weakened as a result of the addition of Australia, China, India, Indonesia and South Korea 
as G20 members; South Korea even stole a march on Japan by securing the role of host of the 
first Asian G20 meeting in November 2010. Certainly Japan has previously championed 
reform of the G8 through its outreach programme, particularly when it has hosted the 
summits in 1993 (by trying to include Indonesia), 2000 (by attempting to invite China and 
holding the first meeting with African countries on the periphery of the summit) and 2008 (by 
creating a dialogue with the G5 ± Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa ± and 
inviting Asian neighbours South Korea, Indonesia and Australia). However, Japanese 
policymakers acknowledge limits to outreach and support it only if it does not threaten the 
core composition and identity of the original summit members, in which a continued utility 
and purpose is seen to exist. In answer to the first question, this debate is by its very nature 
ongoing but became DSDUWLFXODUIRFXVRIDWWHQWLRQDKHDGRIWKH/¶Aquila Summit of the 
G8. Kirton (2009) addressed this in terms of coexistence, co-operation and competition. 
Based upon these categories, the range of settlements includes: 
1. The straightforward replacement of the G8 by the G20. The G8 has long struggled with its 
perceived illegitimacy born of its exclusive and elite status but combined with its inability to 
respond to the global economic crisis and so the G20 has replaced it as the current forum of 
FKRLFH,QVKRUWWKH*KDVµJRQH ODUJH¶DQGZKDWUHPDLQs is a forum in search of an agenda, 
which will simply wither away. 
2. The disappearance of the G20 and the continuance of the G8 in some form. Some have 
argued that the G20 is simply a temporary measure in response to a crisis and once this issue 
is resolYHGWKHQLWVUDLVRQG¶rWUHZLOOGLVDSSHDU7KH* in contrast, despite failing to respond 
to the current crisis does possess an established and ongoing track record of dealing with a 
range of issues from aid to climate change to terrorism, making predictions of its demise 
greatly exaggerated. Although it is both difficult and unlikely that the G20 can simply be µXQ-
FUHDWHG¶ZLWKRXWSURWHVWIURPWKRVHOHDGHUVZKRQRZILQGWKHPVHOYHVZLWK a seat at the top 
table (it should not be forgotten that the G6 itself was originally only ever intended as an ad 
hoc measure but demonstrated both utility and longevity), especially after the statement at the 
Hugo Dobson Politics 2010 
5 
 
end of the Pittsburgh Summit WKDWGHVLJQDWHGWKH*µWKHSUHPLHUIRUXPIRURXU
international economic co-RSHUDWLRQ¶ which would meet annually in the future, some summit 
watchers argue that the G8 will survive in some form, which leads to the next scenario.  
3. The coexistence and co-operation of both Gs with an agreed division of labour. The G8 has 
not yet withered away but has provided a forum to continue the work of the G20. This is the 
argument that emerges from Paola Subacchi and Eric +HOOHLQHU¶V&KDWKDP+RXVH
Briefing Paper which highlights International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform and the global 
trading system as issues for the G8 to take up in an appropriate fashion. However, although 
the subtitle of the paper UHIHUVWRDµEULGJHEHWZHHQWKH*DQGWKH*¶WKLVDSSHDUVWREH
more of a one-ZD\VWUHHWWKURXJKZKLFKWKH*¶VDJHQGDLVVKDSHGE\WKH*DVWKH summit 
of summits. This is an example of the coexistence thesis but with the G20 in charge as the 
senior partner. Another division of labour between the G8 and G20 might be based on 
function with the former continuing its role as a globalthink-tank and the latter providing the 
required endorsement through its perceived legitimacy. To an extent, this is what has 
happened so far. Alternatively, DV.LUWRQSVXJJHVWVµDQH[SDQGLQJDQG
democratizing G8 will steadily socialize the G20 and see its iGHDOVZLQLQERWKLQVWLWXWLRQV¶
This preserves a leading position for the G8 as a preparation group ahead of the G20 as 
appeared to be the case at the 2010 Toronto Summit. 
4. Finally, a similar situation of coexistence and co-operation may well emerge but in contrast 
no clear division of labour is decided and the waters between the Gs are still muddied, 
OHDYLQJµDGLVRUGHUO\VFUXPRIERGLHVILJKWLQJIRUWXUI¶7KH Economist, 7 October 2004). The 
momentum of these arguments has ebbed and flowed during the four G20 summits and three 
G8 summits held since the onset of the global economic crisis. 1 Based on the importance of 
the G8 to its role in the world as outlined above, Japan clearly has an interest in its settlement. 
-DSDQ¶VUHVSRQVHVWRWKHULVHRIWKHG20 
In managing this specific reconfiguration of the architecture of global governance across 
recent G8 and G20 summits and the more general rebalancing of global power that it 
represents, Japan has exhibited a number of responses: (1) proactivity in the new forum of the 
G20; (2) a desire to defend the G8 and secure its continuation; and (3) efforts to carve out a 
caucus of like-minded countries within the forum of the G20 based upon democracy or their 
regional identity as the defining criteria for membership. As will become clear, these 
positions are not mutually exclusive. 
As regards proactivity, Japan has adopted a remarkably constructive approach to the G20, 
demonstrating its continued commitment to internationalism as seen particularly in Prime 
Minister $VR¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHILUVWWZR*VXPPLWV Japan, for example, did not follow 
the 17 countries and regions (including its Asian neighbours China and Indonesia) that 
introduced protective measures despite their OHDGHUV¶SURPLVHVDWWKH:DVKLQJWon 
Summit, not withstanding that Japan was one of the countries hardest hit by the economic 
downturn. As a result, Japan was held up as an object of praise and an exemplar (see Gordon 
%URZQ¶VFRPPHQWV in Asahi Shinbun, 15 November 2008, p. 2 and Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 
November 2008, S7KLVDSSURDFKFRQWLQXHGDWWKH/RQGRQ6XPPLWZLWK$VR¶VZHOO-
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publicised commitment to provide the IMF with an additional US$100 billion and the 
proposal WKDWPHPEHUVGRXEOHWKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKH,0)¶VJHQHUDOIXQGIURPUS$320 
ELOOLRQ+HZDVDOVRDEOHWREULQJ-DSDQ¶VH[SHULHQFHRIsimilar financial crises to the table 
DQGDOORI-DSDQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVZHUHUHIOHFWHGLQWKHILQDOVXPPLWVWDWHPHQW In addition, Aso 
used the London Summit to demonstrate leadership in other areas, including pledging US$21 
ELOOLRQRI-DSDQ¶VRIILFLDOGHYHORSPHQWDVVLVWDQFH2'$ to the Asian region with the goal of 
stimulating domestic demand and he was the first to be asked by Gordon Brown as host to 
speak at the breakfast meeting on the second day of the London Summit (Asahi Shinbun, 1, 3, 
4 April 2009). In short, Aso was an active participant in the first two G20 summits in 
Washington and London in terms of publicising the measures taken in Japan to promote 
domestic recovery, -DSDQ¶VVXSSRUW for the IMF and its reform (especially in quotas and 
special drawing rights) and support for the dollar as the central currency. Thus Japan has both 
provided policy direction and backed this up by providing the stimulus needed to navigate the 
ZRUOG¶VHFRQomies through the crisis. As DUHVXOWµ-DSDQKDVSURYHQWRbe a G20 leader far 
more than China has ... in G20 diplomacy and in Bretton Woods governance, China followed 
ZKLOH-DSDQOHG¶.LUWRQS,QSDUWWKLV reflects an acknowledgement within 
Japanese policymaking circles that, as at the end of the Cold War, the changed distribution of 
power makes some reform of the global governance architecture inevitable. Equally, it 
demonstrates the resonance of the internationalist norm within Japan and the desire to support, 
rather than undermine, and demonstrate leadership in these multilateral mechanisms of global 
governance. 
$VUHJDUGV-DSDQ¶VHIIRUWVWRGHIHQGWKH*DQGVHFXUHLWVFRQWLQXDWLRQVRPH Japanese 
policymakers have openly expressed concern about the straightforward expansion from G8 to 
G20 based on the belief that the effectiveness of a smaller grouping is diluted in a larger 
forum (Asahi Shinbun, 3 April 2009). In this context, Prime Minister Aso defended the 
position of the G8, but not as part of an uncooperative stonewalling stance. Rather, his 
argument was based upon the effectiveness of the limited membership offered by the G8 
complemented by the practice of bringing in relevant stakeholders as and when necessary. In 
VKRUWLQ-DSDQ¶VYLew the G8 still has a role to play in global economic governance. 
Hatoyama continued the same stance at the Pittsburgh Summit by highlighting the 
importance of political leadership in global governance, and how this was more easily 
achieved among fewer participating countries (Sankei Shinbun, 25 September 2009):  
µ,EHOLHYHWKDWWKH*VKRXOGQRWEHGLVFDUGHG,VD\WKLVEHFDXVH\HVWHUGD\ during the 
working dinner I said the following. The G20 involves twenty or twenty-five people 
gathering and discussing. It is extremely difficult to reach conclusions in such setting. So 
what do you do if conclusions are difficult to reach, and people cannot meet frequently? We 
risk ending up relying on prior co-ordination by our officials. The more we try to come up 
with good solutions in the G20 context, the more the ideas of bureaucrats will come to the 
fore. I am not suggesting that the G20 will not be able to reach conclusions; I do believe this 
time we produced respectable results. But I believe that the number of topics on which we 
can reach conclusions in such a large setting is very limited. On the other hand, at the G8 
political leaders can hold very frank and candid discussions with each other. The Canadian 
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Prime Minister expressed exactly the same view when I had a short meeting with him today. 
He said that the merit of the G8 was that leaders whose values are similar can speak their own 
minds as much as they wish. I believe that a good political reason for the G8, a meeting of the 
developed countries, will continue to exist. 
On the other hand [sic], G8 is not a gathering of just developed countries. Leaders of 
developing and emerging countries will take part as well [in the outreach meetings, etc.]. I 
think there are important discussions to be had in this format. It is all right [sic] to consider 
the G20 as being the premier forum [for international economic co-operation], but that does 
QRWPDNHWKH*LUUHOHYDQW¶.DQWHL 2009). 
Arguments for the continued relevance of the G8 while acknowledging the advent of the G20 
can be heard in other circles. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) stresses the 
importance of the G8 as a mechanism for co-ordinating interests and addressing issues in a 
time of uncertainty, with it even acting as a preparatory group before the G20 (Hokkaido 
Shinbun, 3 July 2009). According to RQH02)$RIILFLDOµ³%5,&V>VLF@FRXQWULHVDUH
XOWLPDWHO\WKRVHWKDWUHDFW´WRZKDW WKH*RIIHUV¶0RUHRYHUµFRQWUDU\WRLWVDSSHDUDQFH
G20 meetings are essentially run by proposals by G8 members. The official said agreements 
reached [at the G8 PHHWLQJ@LQ/¶$TXLODZLOOEHWKHJURXQGLQJWKDWZLOOJXLGH*PHPEHUV
at the 6HSWHPEHUPHHWLQJLQ3LWWVEXUJK¶-DSDQ7LPHV-XO\S%:LWK6DUNR]\¶V 
backtracking on his proposals for the expansion of the G8 and his pledge to host the next G8 
summit on the French Riviera in 2011, the Japanese have welcomed WKHµUHQHZDO¶RIWKH*
and the realisation among summit partners of its utility (interview with senior MOFA official, 
27 June 2010).  
Thus, Japan has adopted a strategy of promoting reform of global economic governance 
while campaigning for the integrity and continuation of a favoured forum. This strategy 
means that Japan is not identified as an obstacle to reform of the architecture of global 
governance while resonating with its tradition of internationalism in global governance and 
desire to preserve its elite status. Nevertheless, this approach may be difficult to sustain in the 
future as the G8±G20 settlement experiences mission creep. 
Finally, Japan has sought to create a core caucus within the larger grouping of the G20. For 
example, former senior Foreign Ministry bureaucrat Tanaka Hitoshi (Tanaka, 2008, p. 22) 
REMHFWVWR6DUNR]\¶VSODQWRFUHDWHD*E\VLPSO\DGGLQJWKH G5 to the G8 and instead 
stresses the G7 as the core institution and the strengthening of its role in supporting global 
order as a group of the leading democracies of the world, relegating the G13 to the status of a 
peripheral consultative grouping. In the case of the G20, although he does not explain how it 
might work, Hitoshi Tanaka (2009, pp. 2±3) sees the role of the G7 as a lighthouse (todai) 
that needs to continue to play a role even as the G20 takes on the management of the global 
economy. So the configuration would be one of coexistence with the G7 as the inner circle 
(naishinen) and the G20 as the outer circle (gaishinen). Democracy is the ideological glue 
that can bind together a core group of G7 summit leaders within a larger G13 or G20. There 
is a degree of consistency here in that this VWUDWHJ\WDSVLQWR-DSDQ¶VORQJ-held belief in the 
RULJLQDO5DPERXLOOHW'HFODUDWLRQ¶V HPSKDVLVRQµRSHQGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\GHGLFDWHGWR
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individual liberty and social DGYDQFHPHQW¶,Q-DSDQHVHH\HVWKLVZRXOGFUHDWHHQRXJK
coherence to create a caucus of risen/matured democratic governments within the G20. The 
idea echoes WKDWRIDFRQFHUWRUOHDJXHRIGHPRFUDFLHVZKLFKZDVKHDUGLQ-RKQ0F&DLQ¶V 
VWDWHPHQWVGXULQJWKH86SUHVLGHQWLDOFDPSDLJQDQG-DSDQ¶VSUHYLRXV attempts to 
exclude Russia from an expanded G7. 
Another possibility is for Japan to carve out and lead an Asian grouping. This presents both 
DQDOWHUQDWLYHWRVWRQHZDOOLQJDQGWDSVLQWR-DSDQ¶VHVWDEOLVKHGUROH in the G8 as the regional 
representative, as well as resonating with other region-building attempts and the Japanese 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VHPSKDVLVRQLWV$VLDQLGHQWLW\ Professor Kashiwagi Shigeo of Keio University 
and the Japanese Ministry of Finance still sees a possible role for Japan as a leader of Asia 
within the G20 broadly and in terms of IMF reform specifically: 
µ,WLVWREHKRSHGWKDW-DSDQZLOOVKRZOHDGHUVKLSLQHQFRXUDJLQJRWKHU$VLDQ countries to play 
a more forward-looking and constructive role ... Japan, while playing its own leadership role, 
should encourage its Asian neighbours to speak up from positions of responsibility 
concerning global issues and should play a major part in conveying Asian opinions to the rest 
RIWKHZRUOG¶.DVKLZDJL 2009, pp. 35±36). 
However, as mentioned above and expressed in JDSDQHVHSROLF\PDNHUV¶VWDWHPHQWV the 
emphasis so far has been placed upon the former grouping based on democracy, rather than 
Asian identity. This may well be a realisation on the Japanese part that the relative decline in 
its power resources, the rise of China and the expanded Asian membership of the G20 
preclude this strategy. 
Conclusions 
Japan is essentially a status quo power. Its goal has been to ensure the success of the G20 in 
addressing the global economic crisis while preserving a position for the G8. In this light, 
-DSDQ¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHULVHRIWKH*FRXOGEHGHVFULEHGDVWHQWDWLYH and contradictory: 
tentative in that it is feeling its way through the evolving G20 process while negotiating a role 
for itself and a possible constituency to lead; contradictory in that Japan is responding to the 
internationalist norm of playing (and being seen to play) a leading role in a summit format 
that by its expanded QDWXUHGLOXWHV-DSDQ¶VWUDGLWLRQDOUROHV 
The case study of the G8/G20 suggests two implicatiRQVIRU-DSDQ¶VSODFHLQWKH world at a 
WLPHRIFKDQJH)LUVWWKHUHLVDQHPHUJLQJVHQVHWKDW-DSDQ¶VJOREDODQG regional roles are in 
decline at the expense of China. This can be seen most starkly in the G20 in terms of regional 
leadership with attention squarely focused on China (and, in particular, talk of a G2 of the US 
and China). Wendy Dobson (2009) argues that East Asian representation within the G20 
FRXOGFUHDWHµWKHEDVLVIRUDPRUH strategic approach to trade and finance in the region that 
replaces current ad hoc DUUDQJHPHQWV¶:KRZLOOOHDGWKLV$VLDQJURXSLQJLVXQFOHDU:LWKLQ
the G8 and other forums Japan has traditionally led, but Dobson sees China and India as 
serious competitors. Recent statements by the Japanese government appear to have eschewed 
a leadership role and instead have emphasised a regional role for Japan based on the woolly 
concept of yuai (fraternity) that outlines a position for Japan as a middle regional power in an 
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East Asian community while maintaining its alliance with the US as part of a hedging 
strategy (Hatoyama, 2009). 
6HFRQG-DSDQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRPXOWLODWHUDOPHFKDQLVPVRIJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHGRHV not seem 
to be in any way diminished. Despite failing to secure the role of host of a G20 summit and 
FRQFHUQVDERXW-DSDQ¶V role in a forum where its voice is only RQHRI-DSDQ¶VSURDFWLYH
approach to the G20 so far is salient and can be expected to continue across the institutions 
and forums of international society. In short, isolationism and passivity are not options for 
Japan. As one part of its proactive engagement, Japan appears to be emphasising the 
promotion of the shared values, norms and principles of liberal democracies. This strategy 
has been HYLGHQWLQRWKHUDUHDVRIGLSORPDWLFDFWLYLW\VXFKDV$VR¶VGHVLUHWRSURPRWHDµYDOXH 
RULHQWHGGLSORPDF\¶WKDWVWUHVVHVXQLYHUVDOYDOXHVVXFKDVGHPRFUDF\DQGPDUNHW economics 
LQWKHFUHDWLRQRIDQµDUFRIIUHHGRPDQGSURVSHULW\¶DFURVVWKH(XUDVLDQcontinent. 
-DSDQ¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKH**ZLOOUHPDLQFHUWDLQO\DVORQJDV it is excluded from the UNSC. 
It is likely to continue to follow the strategy that it has taken thus far, working for the success 
of the G20 while securing the continuation of the G8 and seeking a constituency to lead. 
Despite misgivings about the rise of the G20, stonewalling was not and is not a viable 
strategy; it did not stop the expansion of the G7 to include Russia after the end of the Cold 
War. There is also a sense of resignation among MOFA officials that if there was a time for 
resisting the G20 then it has now passed. In any event, such an approach would conflict with 
-DSDQ¶V genuinely innovative approach to reform of the G8 over the last decade or so. Thus, 
-DSDQ¶VHPSKDVLVKDVEHHQRQFOLQJLQJWRWKHGHILQLQJcharacteristics of the original members 
of the G8 as a democratic caucus. The alternative of leading an Asian caucus will be 
increasingly difficult for Japan with attention now on China and 6RXWK.RUHD¶VHDJHUQHVVWR
host a successful G20 summit. As argued by Young (2010), the rules of the game (and the 
architecture of global governance) are changing but not beyond recognition. Within this 
context, it is too early to write off Japan. 
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